Learning in and of corporate venture capital organizations in Germany: industry structure, companies' strategies, organizational learning capabilities by Weber, Christiana & Weber, Barbara
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Weber, Christiana; Weber, Barbara
Working Paper
Learning in and of corporate venture capital organizations in
Germany: industry structure, companies' strategies, organizational
learning capabilities
Veröffentlichung der Abteilung Organisation und Technikgenese des
Forschungsschwerpunktes Technik-Arbeit-Umwelt am WZB, No. FS II 02-108
Provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Suggested citation: Weber, Christiana; Weber, Barbara (2002) : Learning in and of corporate
venture capital organizations in Germany: industry structure, companies' strategies,
organizational learning capabilities, Veröffentlichung der Abteilung Organisation und





Schriftenreihe der Abteilung „Organisation und Technikgenese“ 
des Forschungsschwerpunkts Technik-Arbeit-Umwelt am Wissenschaftszentrum 









FS II 02-108 
 
LEARNING IN AND OF CORPORATE VENTURE  
CAPITAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GERMANY 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE,  
COMPANIES’ STRATEGIES,  

























Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung gGmbH (WZB) 
Reichpietschufer 50, D-10785 Berlin 
Telefon +49 30 25491-0, Fax +49 30 25491-209 
 
                                                 
*  Christiana Weber is an Affiliated Research Fellow with the Research Unit Organization and 
Technology, Wisssenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.  






Based on responses from 20 corporate venture capital organizations (CVCs) 
in Germany, we examine the goals, degree of autonomy, fund structure, and main 
investment criteria underlying the venture strategies of CVCs in Germany today as 
well as how the CVCs have performed strategically and financially.  Further we focus 
on what CVCs did learn based on their experience and which strategic approach to 
corporate venture capital is most likely to lead to high performance. 
The main findings are that an organization’s deal experience tends to 
influence the selection of strategic as opposed to financial goals and affects CVC 
performance.  Individual experience has partly an additional effect on CVC 
performance.  CVCs pursuing an approach that emphasized financial more than 
strategic goals have more experience at transacting deals and are financially – and 
sometimes strategically – more successful than CVCs that focus mainly on strategic 
goals.  These results support conclusions drawn by Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 
(1988) and thereby challenge the findings that Gompers and Lerner (1998) reported 
for the German market in question.  We discuss the limitations and contributions of 






Anhand von 20 Corporate Venture Capitalist Organisationen (CVCs) in 
Deutschland untersuchen wir die Ziele, das Ausmaß an Entscheidungsautonomie, 
die Fondsstruktur sowie die wichtigsten Investitionskriterien, die den Strategien der 
CVCs in Deutschland zugrunde liegen; und wir gehen der Frage nach, wie 
erfolgreich die CVCs in strategischer und finanzieller Hinsicht waren bzw., ob sie ihre 
Ziele erreicht haben. Darüber hinaus richten wir unser Augenmerk darauf, was CVCs 
basierend auf ihren Erfahrungen gelernt haben und welcher strategische Ansatz für 
das Corporate VC-Geschäft allgemein der erfolgversprechendste ist. 
Die Hauptergebnisse machen deutlich, dass die Transaktionserfahrung der 
CVCs, die Wahl der grundsätzlichen Zielrichtung – strategische vs. finanzielle – 
ebenso beeinflusst, wie den CVC-Erfolg. Die individuelle Erfahrung hat nur teilweise 
einen zusätzlichen Einfluß auf den CVC-Erfolg. CVCs, die überwiegend finanzielle 
gegenüber strategischen Zielen verfolgen, verfügen über mehr 
Transaktionserfahrung und sind finanziell – teilweise auch strategisch – erfolgreicher 
als CVCs, die vorwiegend strategische Ziele verfolgen. Diese Ergebnisse stützen 
Erkenntnisse von Siegel, Siegel und MacMillan (1988) und stellen damit 
anderslautende Ergebnisse von Gompers und Lerner (1998), zumindest für den 
deutschen CVC-Markt, in Frage. Wir diskutieren den Beitrag unserer Ergebnisse und 







There is little empirical research on corporate venture capital organizations 
(CVCs) (Maula and Murray 2001a, 2001b; Kann 2000; Gompers and Lerner 1998), 
and most of the relevant literature focuses on the Anglo-American market.  One 
reason for the dearth of empirical data on the German CVC market (Opitz 1990; 
Schween 1996; Witt and Brachtendorf 2002; Rauser 2002) is that CVCs are 
comparatively rare and young in Germany.  Consequently, studies on German CVCs 
are based on an extremely small number of cases.  The studies that do exist tend to 
portray the German market as less successful than more mature markets, such as 
those in the United States (Schween 1996).  The difference between the nature of 
CVCs and that of classical, or independent, venture capital organizations (VCs) in 
terms of such aspects as goals, organizational form, fund structure, and investment 
criteria poses interesting research questions, especially when one links them to their 
later strategic and financial success. 
 
This study inquired into three aspects: 
 
1.  Current data on goals, fund structure, decision-making, and the attainment of 
strategic and financial goals of German CVCs. 
 
2.  The effect that experience, which means learning within the CVC, has on goals 
and their attainment, that is, on the performance of the CVCs.  The distinction 
that Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988) make between CVCs experienced 
and less experienced at transacting deals is applied to the German market in 
order to see the extent to which their conclusions are transferable.  Also, a look 
is taken at the individual experience, or previous background, of the investment 
managers in relation to financial and strategic success. 
 
3.  The effect that the CVC program’s basic goals has on the strategic and financial 
success of CVCs.  The intention is to find out which approach is the most 
promising for the German CVC programs – a prioritization of financial goals, as 
argued by Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988), or a distinctly strategic focus, 
as professed by Gompers and Lerner (1998).  Data from Schween (1996) are 
compared with our own in order to see the extent to which CVCs, or rather the 
parent companies, within Germany have changed in their overall goal over the 
past six years.  We especially ask whether they are operating more successfully 
today than they were in 1996 as a result of their learning experiences. 
 
 
PAST RESEARCH ON CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL 
 
 
The interest and activities of corporations in CVCs have fluctuated markedly in 
the past decades.  Gompers and Lerner (1998) mentioned three major waves, the 
most recent of which began in the late 1990s.  The abundance or lack of research on 
CVCs is a reflection of the economic importance of this sector over time, and 
relatively little research has been conducted on the subject since 1998.  Gompers 




in entrepreneurial firms appear to be at least as successful as those backed by 
independent venture organizations.  As they suggest in their paper: 
 
the presence of a strong strategic focus is critical to the success of CVCs. 
. . . Corporate programs without a strong strategic focus appear to be much 
less stable, frequently ceasing operations after only a few investments, but 
strategically focused programs appear to be as stable as independent 
organizations.  (p. 34) 
 
No statement is made about the role of financial goals and success, making it 
impossible to compare their findings fully with either Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 
(1988) or with this study. 
 
Investigating the autonomy and performance of CVCs, Siegel, Siegel, and 
MacMillan (1988) distinguished between “pilots” and “copilots” within the CVCs 
sample.  Pilots are marked by substantial organizational independence and are 
keenly attuned to return on investment (ROI) and entrepreneurialism in their 
investment criteria.  Copilots are highly dependent on corporate management with 
respect to venture funding and decision-making authority.  They attach greater 
weight to strategic benefits with the corporation, which are more important than 
criteria relating to the entrepreneurial team and to financial performance, such as 
ROI.  The study showed that CVCs tending to act like classical VCs (pilots) achieve 
higher ROI than copilots do and are just as strategically successful for the parent 
company.  The authors of the study therefore concluded that an excessively strong 
insistence on the strategy criteria of the parent company could lead to serious 
problems with the pursuit of CVC activities. 
 
Hence, CVCs are caught in a contradiction, or are at least walking a tightrope.  
On one hand, Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988) demonstrated that an excessively 
strong strategic orientation harms both the strategic and economic success of the 
CVC program.  On the other, Gompers and Lerner (1998) declared that a strong 
strategic focus is critical to success.  In the present study, we ask which of these two 
assessments applies to the German market. 
 
The only known study on corporate venture capital in Germany is by Schween 
(1996).  With a relatively small sample of only 12 CVCs, he investigated their goals, 
investment criteria, and organizational form.  His main results were that 10 of the 12 
companies (83%) – a figure clearly greater than that reported by Siegel, Siegel, and 
MacMillan (1988) – stressed strategic goals, with two companies (17%) stating that 
they pursued strategic and financial goals simultaneously.  The dominance of these 
strategic goals was also reflected in the priority given to the dimensions of the goals 
named.  The most important goal by far was to identify new markets and 
technologies with the assistance of the CVC unit.  Second priority went to criteria 
relating to the market at which portfolio companies take aim.  Growth markets and 
markets highly relevant to the parent company were preferred.  Product 
characteristics were important, with strategic affinity to the parent company having 
special merit.  Financial criteria ranked thereafter.  The success of these CVC 
programs – strategic and financial – was modest.  Only 2 of the 12 CVCs (17%) that 
Schween studied were satisfied with their strategic goals, a figure corresponding to 
an arithmetic mean of 2.0.  The financial goals scored virtually the same result – an 








Based on Schween’s (1996) results, our assumption for the German CVC 
market is that a marked strategic focus as proposed by Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
is not as successful as a system of goals that balances clearly stated financial and 
strategic goals and puts priority on the former without losing sight of the latter.  We 
assume that an investment can be strategically successful only if it is also financially 
tenable or successful. 
 
Hypothesis 1a: 
The more balanced the pursuit of financial and strategic goals in the sense defined 
above, the more financially successful the CVC program is. 
 
Hypothesis 1b: 
The more balanced the pursuit of financial and strategic goals in the sense defined 
above, the more strategically successful the CVC program is. 
 
A study by MacMillan, Block, and SubbaNarasimha (1986) suggested that 
there are significant experience effects in venturing activities.  Siegel, Siegel, and 
MacMillan (1988) tested whether similar effects applied to CVCs.  They found that 
experienced American CVCs began behaving more like independent VCs.  That is, 
they developed a fairly strong orientation to financial goals.  The authority and 
financial commitment they received from the corporation increased, and their ROI 
improved.  We test whether these results from Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988) 
can be adapted to the German CVC market.  We expect the more experienced CVCs 
to be comparable to the American CVCs. 
 
Hypothesis 2a: 
The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the stronger that 




The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the greater that 
organization’s decision-making authority is. 
 
Hypothesis 2c: 
The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the clearer the financial 
commitment of the parent company is. 
 
Hypothesis 2d: 
The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the greater the financial 
success of that organization is. 
 
We also expect both the financial and strategic success to increase with the 









The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the greater that 
organization’s strategic success. 
 
We are additionally interested not only in the deal-transacting experience of a 
CVC as an organization but also in the experience and backgrounds of the individual 
investment managers and in the potential effects that those experiences and 
backgrounds have on the success of the CVC as a whole.  The CVCs that have a 
relatively high percentage of investment managers with relevant professional 
experience (such as new-venture activities, senior management, or corporate 
consulting) are expected to be financially and strategically more successful than 
CVCs with a lower percentage of such investment managers.  This expectation is 
based on the assumption that knowledge about handling uncertainty, risk, and 
conflicts and that experience with organizational structures, strategic orientation, and 
process control are brought to bear in a person’s work. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: 
The higher a CVC’s percentage of investment managers with New Venture 
experience, the more financially and strategically successful that organization is. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: 
The higher a CVC’s percentage of investment managers with a senior 




The higher a CVC’s percentage of investment managers with a corporate 
consulting background, the more financially and strategically successful that 
organization is. 
 
On the basis of Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan’s (1988) distinction between 
pilots and copilots and the result that pilots were financially more successful than 
copilots in the end, we focus on two main characteristics of the differentiation that we 








The greater parent company’s financial commitment to its CVC unit, the more 















Sample and Design 
 
We tested the hypotheses against data from both a questionnaire 
administered to 34 CVCs in 2001 and a follow-up telephone interview conducted in 
February 2002 with the 20 CVCs that had completed the questionnaire.  To ensure at 
least the possibility that the CVCs in our sample had experience with deal 
transaction, we included only those that had been founded in 2000 or earlier. 
 
The 20 CVCs responded that constituted a high return rate (62.5%) for a 
mailed questionnaire type of survey.  These organizations included all the major 
players on the German CVC market, so they can be assumed to represent 
approximately 80% of the total investment volume there, a figure that permits 
reasoned generalizations.  One of the CVCs in this sample had already left the 
market by the time the follow-up telephone interviews were conducted in February 
2002.  The subsequent part of the survey therefore proceeded with the remaining 19 
organizations.  
 
The validity and reliability of the data were verified in a number of ways.  First, 
we pretested the five-page questionnaire with several investment managers.  We did 
the same with the questionnaire for the telephone interviews.  The data from the two 
survey waves were combined.  In order to identify and verify the most important 
results despite the small number of cases, we analyzed the data by using cross-
tabulations, including Chi-square tests, Tau B (Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient 
(τ)), Cramér’s statistic for contingency tables (V), regression analyses, and factor 
analyses.  In addition to dummy variables, we used factor analyses of discrete 
variables in order to regress selected variables in different ways and to test the 
consistency of the results. 
 
Variables and Measures 
 
Although one purpose of our analyses was to compare our data with those 
reported by Schween (1996), we did not adopt all the questions and response 
categories of that study verbatim.  It seemed to us more purposeful at certain points 
to expand or reduce some of Schween’s response categories or replace them with 
ones we believed to be more appropriate.  Such changes did complicate 
comparability in some cases but did not unduly compromise the adequacy and 
currency of the research design.  The following variables and measures are a mix of 
those we constructed ourselves and those we adopted from Siegel, Siegel, and 
MacMillan (1988) and Schween (1996). 
 
1.  Significance of financial goals 
Scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (exclusively financial goals) to 5 
(exclusively strategic goals) 
 
2.  Value of investment criteria 
A total of 29 criteria, scored on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (no importance) 





3. Decision-making  authority 
Scored in four categories: Important decisions such as those concerning 
investments are made (a) within the CVC unit and without the parent company, 
(b) in close consultation and in concert with the parent company, (c) within a 
committee in the parent company as proposed by the CVC unit, or (d)  in 
accordance first with (a), thereafter (c), depending on the sum to be invested 
 
4.  Financial commitment by the parent company 
(a) A clearly defined fund or freely accessible financial means providing for a 
relatively long period; (b) no clearly defined fund or no financial means providing 
for a relatively long period; instead, ad hoc decisions recorded as an outflow on 
the balance sheet 
 
5.  Experience with deals (for measuring potential learning effects) 
As in Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988), measured as the number of deals 
transacted 0–10 = inexperienced with deals; 11 or more deals = experienced 
with deals).  We did not take “years in business” as a characteristic in this study, 
“since a CVC who had been in existence for several years but had made few 
deals would still be relatively inexperienced” (p.  243).  In other words, what 
triggers a learning experience may or may not lie well within the given period 
(Weber and Berthoin Antal 2001, p. 363). 
 
6.  Background of the investment managers 
Scored as the percentage of a CVC’s employees represented by investment 
managers with experience in senior management, new ventures, or corporate 
consulting. 
 
7.  Strategic success or attainment of strategic goals 
Scored on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (completely attained) to 5 (completely 
unattained).  An arithmetic mean was calculated as an additional measure of 
this variable. 
 
8.  Financial success or attainment of financial goals 
Scored on the basis of the internal rate of return (IRR), not on Schween’s 5-
point scale of satisfaction.  In order to compare our figures with Schween’s and 
to calculate an arithmetic mean, the subdivision of the individual percentages 
were converted into satisfaction scores based on very conservative 
assumptions.  An IRR smaller than 0% was equated with “unsatisfied.”  Higher 
IRRs were interpreted as follows: 0% to 10%: “rather unsatisfied” to “rather 
satisfied”; 11% to 20%: “satisfied”; above 20%: “very satisfied.” 
 
Methodological Information  
 
The analyzed CVCs represent the majority of all active CVCs in Germany. It 
can therefore be assumed that they represent the entire German market.  It is not 
possible to specify whether the sample has a systematic bias, for no appropriate 
comparative data exists for Germany thus far.  Not every analytical method, 
especially some of the regression analyses, revealed statistical relationships 
between substantively important characteristics.  Arguably, though, results of the 




generalized to all 37 CVC operating on the German market.  Other substantive 
limitations arise from two facts.  First, the CVC market in Germany is still 
comparatively young.  Second, the slump on the new market has by and large 
considerably reduced the existing perspectives of the VCs.  These two 
circumstances meant that some of the interviewees could not yet answer questions 
about their strategic and their financial success.  These participants in the study had 
not been on the market long enough and/or market conditions had not allowed them 
to leave it.  To provide a clear picture of these relationship tendencies, we report the 






First, the structure and conditions of the German CVC market is described in 
terms of characteristics selected for this study: strategic goals, investment criteria, 
fund structure, degree of autonomy, and attainment of strategic and financial goals 
(performance). 
 
1.  Strategic and financial goals 
Of the 19 CVCs surveyed, 42% stated that they mainly or exclusively pursued 
strategic goals; 21%, mainly financial goals.  Strategic and financial goals were 





Goals of Corporate Venture Capital Organizations 
Goals  Schween (1996)  Weber and Weber 
(2002) 
Solely strategic  25  5 
Primarily strategic  58  37 
Strategic and financial  17  37 
Primarily financial  0  21 
Solely financial  0  0 





2. Investment  criteria 
The CVCs ranked “uniqueness and degree of innovation represented by the 
product” as the most important investment criterion (mean: 5.4 on a scale of 1 
to 6).  “The ability of the management team to attract highly qualified 
employees” was ranked second (5.3), and “the expected return at the point of 
exit” was ranked a close third along with “experience in the line of business” and 





Investment Criteria of Corporate Venture Capital Organizations (CVCs) 
and Independent Venture Capital Organizations (VCs) 
Investment criteria 
(by average level of significance) 
Weber and Dierkes 
(in press)* 
—————————– 
  CVCs         Indep. VCs 





(n = 5) 
Product’s uniqueness or innovativeness  1 (5.4)  1 (5.4)  3 (4.0) 
Management’s ability to attract and retain highly 
qualified employees  2 (5.3)  3 (5.0)  - 
Expected return at point of exit; 10-fold increase 
in investment in 5 to 10 years  3 (5.2)  1 (5.4)  7 (2.6) 
Industry experience; management team’s 
knowledge of the market  3 (5.2)  1 (5.4)  2 (4.2) 
Quality of management team’s leadership  3 (5.2)  2 (5.1)  3 (4.0) 
Completeness of the management team  4 (5.1)  6 (4.7)  - 
Potential, size, and growth of the market  5 (5.0)  5 (4.8)  1 (4.6) 
Ability to assess risk correctly and respond 
accordingly 
-  - 1  (4.6) 
Members of management team with whom the 
“chemistry is right”  6 (4.9)  3 (5.0)  - 
Management’s ability to communicate  6 (4.9)  4 (4.9)  4 (3.8) 
Demonstrable acceptance of the product on the 
market  6 (4.9)  5 (4.8)  2 (4.2) 
Management team’s complementarity  6 (4.9)  5 (4.8)  3 (4.0) 
Entrepreneur’s high performance and 
perseverance 
-  - 3  (4.0) 
Ability to take criticism  -   3  (4.0) 
Extensive knowledge of the product  -  - 4  (3.8) 
Ability to build, convey, or retain an image of 
the corporation as an innovator*** 
7 (4.5)  - - 
Reputation of the portfolio company’s partners 
or customers   8 (4.4)  10 (4.0)  - 
Management’s experience with new ventures  9 (4.3)  10 (4.0)  - 
Potential strategic business partners or 
alliances for the corporate mother  9 (4.3)  -  2 (4.2) 
Expected time until product is ready for the 
market; prototype exists  10 (4.2)  7 (4.5)  7 (2.4) 
Patent protection of the products  11 (4.0)  8 (4.4)  5 (3.6) 
No expectation of relevant competition within 
first 3 years  12 (2.9)  11 (3.2)  5 (3.6) 
Important market for the corporate mother***  -  - 4  (3.8) 
Same market as that of the corporate mother***  -  - 6  (3.0) 
Note: The numbers in this table indicate the ranking of the criteria.   
*  Average values on a scale ranging from 1 (unimportant) to 6 (very important). 
** Average values on a scale ranging from 1 (unimportant) to 5 (very important). 
***Refers only to CVCs. 
 
 
3. Capital  structure 
Fully 68% of the CVCs surveyed had their own fund; 32% stated that they did 
not invest from a defined fund. 
 
4. Decision-making  autonomy 
In 16% of all the surveyed organizations, investment decisions (at least up to a 




company; 16% decided jointly in close consultation with the parent company.  
The remaining 68% of the surveyed CVCs made suggestions to the parent 
company, which then took the decisions alone. 
 
5.  Attainment of strategic goals 
A total of 53% of the CVCs stated that they had “completely” or “largely” 
attained their strategic goals; 37%, that their goals had been only “partly” or 
“largely” unattained.  A total of 10% of the CVCs explained that their CVC unit 
was not yet long enough in business in order to draw such conclusions (see 
Table 3).  Converting these values into an arithmetic mean (scored on a scale 
from 1 [low] to 5 [high]), one arrives at an average of 3.7 (see Table 4).  For 
21% of the CVCs, attainment of strategic goals consisted in their CVC activities 
having helped them develop new strategic fields of business.  The remaining 
79% of the CVCs did not report such success.  According to 84% of the 




Table 3               Table 4 
Attainment of Strategic Goals           Arithmetic Means of Finan. and Strat. Goal Attainm. 









Schween (1996)  Weber and Weber (2002) 
Complete 16    Strategic 2  3.7 
Most 37    Financial 1.9  3.0 
Roughly even  32        
Mostly not  5        
Still to early to tell  10        
Total 100        
 
 
6.  Attainment of financial goals 
Just under half (47%) of the CVCs in the study claimed to have attained their 
financial goals; 21% were not successful.  About one third (32%) reported that it 
was still too early for them to respond to this item and that no exits had occurred 




Attainment of Financial Goals 
IRR*  
(in percentages) 
Companies in the 
sample (%) 
< 0  (not achieved, unsatisfied)  21 
0–10  (achieved, rather unsatisfied to rather satisfied)  16 
11–20 (largely  achieved/satisfied)  10 
> 20  (Completely attained or satisfied)  21 
< 0  (because either it is still too early to tell or there 
have been no exits from the market ye)t  32 
Total 100 






TEST OF THE HYPOTHESES 
 
 
Having presented the findings on the structure of the corporate venture 
population in Germany, we can now turn to testing our hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1a: 
The more balanced the pursuit of financial and strategic goals in the sense defined 
above, the more financially successful the CVC program is. 
Only 25% of the CVCs that pursued mainly or exclusively strategic goals 
reported that they had attained their financial goals.  All CVCs (100%) that had 
pursued mainly financial goals stated that they had attained their financial goals.   
Regression analysis confirmed the statistical significance of the latter results (see 




Financial Success 2 (Adjusted R
2: .237) 
Criteria Coefficient  t test 
Pursuing primarily financial goals  .467  2.034 




The more balanced the pursuit of financial and strategic goals in the sense defined 
above, the more strategically successful the CVC program is. 
Of the CVCs with mainly or exclusively strategic goals, 63% largely or 
completely attained them.  Among the CVCs that pursued mainly financial goals, 
75% attained their strategic goals.  This nearly comparable result was borne out by 




Strategic Success (Adjusted R
2: .305) 
Criteria                                             Coefficient             t test 
Senior management exp.  .395  1.557 
Primarily strategic goals  .590  2.335 
Committee in corporate  –.492  –2.115 
Primarily financial goals  .448  1.869 
Experience with deals  .365  1.558 




The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the stronger that 
organization’s orientation is to financial goals and the weaker its orientation to 
strategic goals. 
Of the CVCs inexperienced at transacting deals, 11% pursued mostly financial 
goals; 56%, exclusively or largely strategic goals.  Among the CVCs that did have 
experience with deals, only 25% pursued exclusively or largely strategic goals; 25% 
pursued financial ones.  Hypothesis 2a was thereby confirmed.  Regression analysis 







Primarily Financial Goals (Adjusted R
2: .472) 
Criteria  Coefficient  t test 
Consulting experience  –.396  –2.119 
Chemistry fit  .532  2.948 
Senior Management experience  .516  2.517 
Experience with deals  .431  2.241 




The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the greater that organization’s 
decision-making authority is. 
The very unbalanced distribution and tiny number of CVCs with independent 
decision-making authority render it very difficult to make statements about 
relationships between deal-transacting experience and decision-making authority.  Of 
the CVCs inexperienced with deals, 89% did not make their investment decisions 
alone; 11% did.  Among those that did have experience with deals, 25% made their 
investment decisions alone; 75% of these CVCs made the decisions jointly with the 
parent company, or the parent company made them alone.  Although the cross-
tabulation seemed to confirm hypothesis  2b, the regression analysis suggested that 




Clearly Defined Fund (Adjusted R
2: .047) 
Criteria                                 Coefficient    t test 




The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the clearer the financial 
commitment of the parent company is. 
Of the CVCs inexperienced with deals, 67% had a clearly defined fund; 33% 
did not finance the investments from a fund.  Among the CVCs that did have 
experience with deals, 75% stated that they invest from a clearly defined fund, and 




The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the greater the financial 
success of that organization is. 
We also expect both the financial and strategic success to increase with the number 
of deals transacted. 
Just under half (47%) of the CVCs in the study stated that they had attained 
their financial goals.  Among the organizations experienced with deals, the figure was 
75%.  Only 22% of the organizations inexperienced with deals reported having 
achieved their financial goals.  Regression analysis bore out these results and 







Financial Success 1 (Adjusted R
2: .802) 
Criteria                                             Coefficient              t test 
Consulting experience  –.677  –4.029 
Clearly defined fund  –.282  –2.291 
No new venture experience  .305 2.249 
Primarily financial goals  .367 2.673 
Senior management exp.  .228  1.650 
Experience with deals  .183  1.315 
Committee in corporate   –.124  –.937 




The greater a CVC’s experience with deal transaction, the greater that organization’s 
strategic success. 
Strategic goals were reported to have been largely or completely attained by 
63% of the CVCs experienced with deals, as opposed to 44% of the CVCs 
inexperienced with deals.  This result, too, was borne out by regression analysis (see 
Table 7).  Hypothesis 2e was thereby confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 3a: 
The higher a CVC’s percentage of investment managers with New Venture 
experience, the more financially and strategically successful that organization is. 
Of the CVCs in which fewer than half of the investment managers had 
experience with new ventures, 58% declared that they had largely or completely 
attained their strategic goals.  Of the CVCs in which half or more of the investment 
managers had experience with new ventures, 43% declared that they had largely or 
completely attained their strategic goals.  The figures were similar for financial 
success, which was reported by 58% of the CVCs that were less experienced with 
new ventures and by only 29% of the CVCs in the control group.  Hypothesis 3a was 
therefore not confirmed.  The regression results were mixed for the strategic and 
financial success of CVCs with “no new venture experience” having a positive effect 
on financial success (see Table 10). 
 
Hypothesis 3b: 
The higher a CVC’s percentage of investment managers with a senior management 
background, the more financially and strategically successful that organization is. 
A different picture emerges when it comes to senior management experience.  
Of the CVCs in which 30% or fewer of the investment managers had senior 
management functions, 38% of the organizations reported having largely or 
completely attained their strategic goals.  Among the CVCs in which 31% to more 
than 80% of the investment managers had senior management experience, 83% of 
the organizations declared they had attained their strategic goals.  The latter result 
was borne out by regression analysis.  Financial success was reported by 31% of the 
first group and by 83% of the experienced group.  The latter figure was likewise 








The higher a CVC’s percentage of investment managers with a corporate consulting 
background, the more financially and strategically successful that organization is. 
In the group of CVCs in which no more than 40% of the investment managers 
had a background in corporate consulting, 43% stated that they had largely or 
completely attained their strategic goals.  In the group of CVCs in which anywhere 
from 41% to more than 80% of the organization’s investment managers had a 
background in corporate consulting, 80% of the organizations claimed to have 
attained their strategic goals.  The picture was the opposite for financial success, with 
financial success being claimed by 64% of the first group and none (0%) of the 
second group.  The latter figure was borne out by regression analysis (see Table 10).  




The greater a CVC’s decision-making authority, the more successful that 
organization is. 
As previously mentioned, the extremely small number of cases in one of the 
two samples renders it especially difficult to make a statement on the decision-
making authority of the CVCs.  Of the CVCs that made their investment decisions 
independently of the parent company, 67% stated that they were financially 
successful and that they had largely or completely attained their strategic goals.   
Among the CVCs that did not make their investment decisions on their own and 
instead submitted proposals to the parent company, this figure stood at 46%.  Both 
results were additionally borne out by regression analysis (see Tables 7 and 10). 
Hypothesis 4a was thereby confirmed. 
 
Hypothesis 4b: 
The greater parent company’s financial commitment to its CVC unit, the more 
successful the CVC unit is. 
Of the CVCs with their own fund, 54% responded that they had largely or 
completely attained their strategic goals.  The CVCs in the control group, which had 
no fund of their own, reported nearly the same attainment of strategic goals (50%).  
As for the attainment of financial goals, this second group did much better than the 
first, with 83% stating that they were financially successful as opposed to 31% of the 
CVCs that had a fund of their own.  This result was borne out by regression analysis 

















Table 11 summarizes our findings.  It shows which of the above hypotheses 




Confirmation and Rejection of Our Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Cross-tabulation Regression  analysis 
1a Confirmed  Confirmed 
1b Rejected  Rejected 
2a Confirmed  Partly  confirmed 
2b Weakly  confirmed  Rejected 
2c Rejected  Rejected 
2d Confirmed  Confirmed 
2e Confirmed  Confirmed 
3a Rejected  Rejected 
3b Confirmed  Confirmed 
3c Confirmed  Partly  confirmed 
4a Confirmed  Confirmed 






This investigation has gathered current, generalizable data on goals, 
investment criteria, decision-making authority, capital structure, and goal attainment 
pertaining to the German CVC market for the first time in six years.  This update was 
urgently necessary because the CVC market in the period under study has nearly 
tripled in size, though the number of such organizations is still miniscule compared to 
that in the United States (approximately 300).  Our survey is the first to explore how 
the success of CVCs is affected by the experience they have as organizations and by 
the experience of their individual employees, an issue that has only recently seemed 
relevant.  The new data can serve as a basis for a wide variety of analyses, including 
comparison between CVCs and the classical, or independent, German VCs (see 
Weber and Dierkes in press) and comparison with data provided by other research 
on the CVC market.  The purpose of this paper is to analyze the available data and to 
compare it to the information reported by Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988) for the 
U.S. CVC market and to that from Schween (1996) on the German CVC market. 
 
Our second research question – whether the German CVCs learned and 
whether experience had an impact on performance – can be answered affirmatively 
as far as experience with deal transaction is concerned (see Tables 7 and 10).  The 
answers in terms of the experience of the individual investment managers depend on 
what each manager had done previously.  The results show that CVCs differ not only 
in terms of whether they are experienced at transacting deals (47%) or inexperienced 
at transacting deals (53%) but also – and sometimes considerably – in terms of the 
other selected variables.  Experience with deals (understood to be proof of a learning 
process) has an effect on both the selection and attainment of strategic and financial 
goals.  This finding confirms the results reported by Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 
(1988).  Such experience however seems to have minor effect on decision-making 




Table 9).  These facts may indicate that the learning process of experienced CVCs 
and a narrowing of the difference between CVCs and independent VCs has not yet 
progressed as far in the transaction of deals as it has in, say, the selection of goals.  
Nonetheless, this result does not necessarily indicate nonlearning on the part of the 
CVCs.  They might have opted – after an examination of these structures and 
processes – to retain or consciously continue the proven, established practices, also 
a decision that would result from the learning process.  These different possible 






Criteria                                 Coefficient    t test 
No new venture exp.  –.489  –2.237 
Experience with deals  .242  1.106 
 
 
As for the experience of the individual investment managers and its potential 
influence on success, it is clear that the most successful CVCs are those that have a 
high percentage of investment managers with a senior management background in 
their organizations (see Tables  7 and 10).  Surprisingly, the experience that 
investment managers have with new ventures had little effect on the success of the 
CVCs (see Table  7).  A background in corporate consulting seemingly tended to 
have partly a negative effect, for the CVCs with a high percentage of such 
consultants were precisely the ones with financially unsuccessful operations (see 
Table 10).  An explanation for these differences in effect might be that the investment 
managers with senior management backgrounds not only have experience in 
convincing, handling operational matters, overcoming conflicts, and other matters but 
also enjoy enhanced standing and credibility in the eyes of the portfolio company and 
especially the parent company.  After all, the portfolio company can truly benefit from 
the economies of this strategic investor only if the network represented by the 
investment manager as a facilitator between those two organizations extends into the 
business units that are relevant to the portfolio company.  Also in such instances, an 
investment manager with senior management experience – especially if having 
worked in the corporate – is more likely to deliver value added. 
 
Which approach is more promising for German CVC activities – putting priority 
on financial goals or rather on strategic goals?  A comparison between the 
Schween’s (1996) data and ours may help steer us to an answer to this, our third, 
research question.
1  We checked whether the CVCs had changed the priorities of 
their goals and investment criteria over time and, above all, whether they were 
operating more successfully today than they were six years ago. 
 
1. Goals   
Since 1996 priority has clearly shifted from strategic to financial goals.  In 1996, 
83% of the surveyed CVCs still stated that that were pursuing purely or mainly 
strategic goals, whereas today that figure stands at 42% (see Table 1).  The 
remaining 17% of the CVCs in the 1996 survey stated that they practiced a 
                                                 
1  This comparison is not based on a panel.  It is a comparison between aggregate data based on 




balanced pursuit of strategic and financial goals.  The figure today is 36%.  It 
seems especially noteworthy that 21% of the surveyed CVCs stated that they 
were pursuing largely financial goals.  There were no such responses in 1996.  
These results mean that the behavior of CVCs is converging with that of the 
classical German VCs (Weber and Dierkes in press).  
 
2. Investment  Criteria 
A look at the most important investment criteria highlights the shift to 
emphasizing financial goals over strategic ones.  Financial criteria were 
completely neglected in 1996, whereas they have become one of the three 
most important criteria today (see Table 2) – about on par with the priority they 
receive among the classical VCs in Germany (Weber Dierkes in press).  In 1996 
the surveyed CVCs regarded market size and market growth as the most 
important investment criterion.  It now ranks fifth (see Table 2). 
 
3.  Attainment of strategic goals 
Attainment of strategic goals has definitely improved over the past six years.  
Whereas 17% of the surveyed CVCs in 1996 stated that they had largely or 
completely attained their strategic goals, this figure stands at 53% in 2002.  The 
arithmetic mean for the attainment of strategic goals has nearly doubled within 
the past six years, rising from 2 to 3.7 (see Tables 3 and 4). 
 
4.  Attainment of financial goals 
The CVCs have also greatly improved in the attainment of their financial goals 
in past years.  In 1996 only 17% of the surveyed CVCs stated that they had 
attained their financial goals, whereas in 2002 just under half (47%) claimed to 
have done so (see Table 5).  The arithmetic mean reported by Schween (1996) 
was 1.9; today’s mean of 3.0 means a 58% increase (see Table 4).  It seems 
striking that only 25% of the strategy-oriented CVCs have achieved their 
financial goals, whereas the financially oriented CVCs have achieved 100% of 
their financial goals.  The results on the relation between capital structure and 
goal attainment are surprising (see Table 10), for we found that having one’s 
own investment fund tended to have a negative effect on financial success.   
The observations by Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988) are not confirmed for 
the German CVC market. 
 
We can thus answer our third research question by saying that CVCs 
emphasizing financial rather than strategic goals are not only more experienced with 
deals (see Tables 8 and 13) but also more financially and strategically successful 
(see Tables 6 and 7).  It has been shown that an unambiguously strategic orientation 
has no positive effect on a CVC’s success and tends instead to detract.  Our results 
therefore confirm the conclusions drawn by Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan (1988).  
The observations by Gompers and Lerner (1998) are challenged, at least for the 
German CVCs.  Apart from this specific issue of theory-testing, today’s higher 
performance of CVCs leads us to summarize by stating that the CVCs in Germany 
have undergone a clearly positive learning process in their reorientation toward 
classical VCs and in the ensuing increased emphasis on financial goals.  However, 
this shift should not belie the message that a balanced, “proper mix of goals” seems 
to be the CVC’s road to financial and strategic success, to the ability to acquire and 
use the potential competitive advantages of CVCs.  This lesson seems particularly 









Primarily Strategic Goals (Adjusted R
2: .015) 
Criteria                                 Coefficient     t test 
Experience with deals  –.203  –.853 
 
 
There are two aspects to this guidance.  One is to give the business units 
incentives, a binding commitment to provide support services for the portfolio 
companies.  The CVC unit and its portfolio company can be only as good as the 
teams of the parent company behind them.  This interface with the parent company 
must not be left to chance or to the network of individual investment managers (Witt 
and Brachtendorf 2002), which may or may not be well informed.  The second aspect 
is that the business units must be assured that their involvement will pay off in the 
long run, that is, that newly acquired know-how will be fed back into the appropriate 
units of the parent company.  A process for systematically transferring knowledge, 
technology, and other resources in both directions should be institutionalized.  Such 
processes should assure access for the portfolio companies to the required 
resources in the parent company.  They should also enable the business units of the 
parent company to have access to promising innovations, which will provide 
competitive advantages in the future as well as strengthen existing business areas 
and develop new ones. 
 
This study makes four contributions to the literature on CVC and 
organizational learning and has a number of implications for research.  From the 
theoretical perspective, it was the first empirically grounded analysis of CVCs since 
1996, the point at which the CVC market in Germany began to gain any significance 
at all.  Second, our research provides further empirical validation of the effect that 
organizational experience and learning have on performance.  Third, it extends the 
existing literature on learning in that it calls attention to the impact that the experience 
of individuals in CVCs has on performance.  Fourth, by questioning the priority that 
CVCs have thus far placed on the pursuit of strategic goals (Gompers and Lerner 
1998), this investigation supports the shift toward emphasis on financial goals instead 
(Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 1988).  
 
Further research on CVCs is definitely necessary in Germany.  It would be 
intriguing to have the present work become a longitudinal study.  It would then be 
possible to follow the goals, structures, processes, and success of the CVC market in 
general and of individual organizations in particular.  Such a longitudinal study should 
compare CVCs and classical VCs directly.  There should be continued research on 
the previously noted interface between the parent company and the CVC unit as a 
facilitator between the parent company and the portfolio company – a topic that has 
been treated rather randomly thus far.  For instance, structuring and improving the 
inter- and intraorganizational learning processes of the involved units could enhance 
the competitive advantage of the parent company through innovative ideas of 
portfolio companies and could increase the success of the portfolio company by 
benefiting from the vast resources and knowledge of the parent.  We also urge that 




relationship between the portfolio company, the CVC, and the parent company has 
for the individual employee and for organizational culture, for these three actors, too, 
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